Green Service Commitments, Strategic Waiting, and Carbon Transparency in Digital Platform Supply Chains
Main article
Abstract
This article revisits a platform supply chain problem in which a manufacturer chooses a wholesale price and product-level green effort, while an online retailer sets intertemporal prices and promised service speeds under strategic consumer waiting. Building on a two-period game-theoretic structure, the study explains how carbon transparency, fulfillment promises, and forward-looking demand interact in digital retail settings. The analysis compares a fixed-service regime with a dynamic-service regime and shows that service flexibility can work as an intertemporal screening device rather than a simple logistics adjustment. Dynamic service is most valuable when the market contains a meaningful but not overwhelming share of strategic consumers, because early fulfillment acceleration can partially substitute for markdowns. Green effort also changes the timing of demand by increasing the attractiveness of early purchase, especially when service sensitivity is moderate. To reduce channel misalignment, the paper evaluates a service-investment sharing contract in which the manufacturer subsidizes part of the retailer’s service cost. The contract improves coordination in parameter regions where flexible service raises total channel profit but weakens the retailer’s private incentive to invest. The paper contributes a unified perspective on green operations, digital platform design, and intertemporal consumer behavior.
